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Banking on industry: the impact of financial services on
regional industrial structure and development
By JAAP W.B. BOS, MARTA DEGL’INNOCENTI *
We investigate the extent to which local banking market characteris-
tics can explain where small enterprises (SEs) are located and how they
thrive. We start from a simple theory that explains the channels along
which local banking market structure can affect the growth of SEs. Sub-
sequently, we make use of a highly detailed data set, exploit unique fea-
tures of the Italian banking system and find that the structure of the
banking system explains the regional distribution of SEs in Italy, in
particular through the historical presence of small banks.
JEL: G21, R11, C21, D40
Keywords: SMEs, Banking, Market Structure
I. Introduction
Small Enterprises (SEs) tend to have a complex relationship with the banks
that provide them with loans. Not only do they rely on bank loans for financing
new investment, but in addition their (lack of) size often makes them opaque and
ill-fitting for the 'cookie cutter' process with which large financial institutions
assess their loan applications (Cole, Goldberg and White, 2004). There are more
than 20 million SEs in the EU, representing 99 percent of all businesses. SEs are
the propulsive engine of European economic growth, alleviating poverty (Beck,
Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2005).
But where are they located? How do they thrive? Who finances their invest-
ments? In this paper, we contribute to providing answers to these questions, by
focusing on one important, but often overlooked, ingredient in the success for-
mula for SEs: the existence of small banks. We study the relationship between
the share of small banks in a local market and the share of SEs in that same mar-
ket.
Small banks may be crucial to the survival of small businesses, since they may
be better at managing soft information, collected via personal interaction and
difficult to codify. In contrast, large, hierarchically organized banks may expe-
rience more organizational frictions in lending to small borrowers, especially
if the latter are opaque and/or innovative (Peek and Rosengren, 1995; Berger
and Udell, 2002; Berger et al., 2005; Liberti and Mian, 2009; Alessandrini, Pres-
* Bos: Maastricht University School of Business and Economics, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD, Maastricht, The
Netherlands, j.bos@maastrichtuniversity.nl. Degl’Innocenti: corresponding author, Southampton Business
School, University of Southampton, Southampton, UK, m.deglinnocenti@soton.ac.uk. The usual disclaimer
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bitero and Zazzaro, 2010). Furthermore, large banks may have the upper hand in
lending to small, opaque SEs through their use of transaction technologies that
process hard information in more efficient, novel ways (Berger and Udell, 2006;
De la Torre, Perı´a and Schmukler, 2010; Berger and Black, 2011).
We contribute to this stream of research by exploring the relationship between
the location of small banks and the numbers and distribution of SEs in local
markets. Our 'laboratory' for doing so is Italy, which has the largest number of
SEs in the EU with 3.813 million SES with less than 10 employees. SEs contribute
29.5% of value-added (21.2% for the EU-28) and 46% of employment (EU-28:
29.5%). Almost of 11% of the SEs in manufacturing are engaged in high- or mid-
to-high-tech activities, in line with the European average (EU-27: 12%).1
Importantly, for Italy we can make smart use of two consecutive regulatory
changes. In 1936, the Italian government imposed a strictly entry regulation
in order to enhance bank stability by limiting bank competition through con-
straints to the opening of new banks and branches. From then on, the opening
of a new branch was subject to strict controls and required explicit authorization
by the Bank of Italy. Consequently, local banking markets in Italy became in-
deed very 'local.' That status quo persisted until 1987, when the Single European
Act became effective in Italy, invalidating the earlier constraints and eventually
resulting in an increase in the number of branches in Italy from 17,721 in 1990 -
when the law indeed was repealed - to 34,146 in 2008 (Benfratello, Schiantarelli
and Sembenelli, 2008). Consequently, the structure of the Italian banking sys-
tem in this period is generally considered to be unrelated to the regional eco-
nomic development of the time (Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2004; Herrera
and Minetti, 2007; Benfratello, Schiantarelli and Sembenelli, 2008; Alessandrini,
Presbitero and Zazzaro, 2009, 2010; Ferri and Murro, 2015).
Therefore, in order to study the causal impact of small bank market share on
the share, location and distribution of SEs, we build an identification strategy
based on branch level banking data from both 1936 and 1987, respectively. We
find that, over the period 1998-2013, approximately 24 percent of the variance
in the local market share of SEs can be attributed to the (historical) presence of
small banks.
To explore the channels along which this presence of small banks affects SEs,
we built on the work of Boot and Thakor (1997) and introduce a simple model
of financial system architecture, where large multi-market banks are informed
agents and local unitary banks function as monitoring agents, very much in line
with the 'cookie cutter versus character' premise of Cole, Goldberg and White
(2004) and others. From the model, we can derive a number of conditions that
would allow SEs to thrive through the presence of small banks. Our highly dis-
aggregated Italian data then allow us to test each of these channels.
From these tests, a clear picture emerges of the small banks-SEs financing link.
SEs need small banks in a (local) economy that is relatively weak, and can thrive
1Source: 2016 SBA fact sheet for Italy.
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through the financing they receive from these banks in the absence of very large,
dominant banks, if there is enough competition among banks in the local mar-
ket and if small banks can provide high quality loan monitoring, by being large
enough and employing high-quality personnel. SEs that thrive in particular
through the presence of small local banks are relatively risky, often financially
fragile and may have an opportunity to capture private rents from borrowing.
Furthermore, we verify whether our results are driven by the innovativeness of
SEs, rather than their size. Finally, we explore what the Italian manufacturing
sector would look like without the liberalization process of 1990.
We are of course not the first to identify the causal relationship between the
development of the Italian banking sector and the share of SEs using the 1987
(and 1936) regulatory changes. Recent related work has for example focused
on the roles of bank branch density (Benfratello, Schiantarelli and Sembenelli,
2008), the functional distance of the local banking system (Alessandrini, Pres-
bitero and Zazzaro, 2009), and bank-firm ties (Herrera and Minetti, 2007; On-
gena, Tu¨mer-Alkan and Westernhagen, 2012; Giannetti, 2012). Hakenes et al.
(2015) investigate the effect of small banks and big banks on promoting local eco-
nomic growth. They find that the presence of savings banks as regional funding
providers boosts the local economic growth, especially in relatively poor regions.
The contribution of this paper is threefold. First, we identify the channels
through which the banking sector and economic environment can facilitate the
creation and accumulation of SEs in a specific region. Second, we provide novel
evidence on how and to what extent the configuration and geographical orga-
nization of the banking industry affects the features of the regional industrial
sector. Third, we identify further economic local factors that can affect the con-
figuration of the regional industrial sector.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section II discusses the theoretical
model and identification strategy. Section ?? describes the database. Section IV
presents the empirical findings. Section V concludes and outlines the directions
for further research.
II. The impact of banking structure on local industrial structure
To investigate the impact of local banking structure on local industrial struc-
ture, in particular the share of SEs, we follow an approach that consists of three,
related parts. First, we develop a straightforward identification strategy to es-
tablish the causal effect of local banking market structure on the local presence
of SEs. Second, we build on Boot and Thakor (1997) and develop a model that
allows us to make out the channels along which this causal effect materializes.
Third, we demonstrate how our identification strategy, together with our theo-
retical model results in an empirical test of the impact of banking structure on
local industrial structure.
3
A. Identifying causality
Our first task is to ensure we can identify the causal impact of local banking
structure on local industrial structure. To do so, we need three things.
First and foremost, we need to exclude endogeneity concerns. As explained
above, the tight regulation of the Italian banking market prior to the period un-
der investigation in this paper helps a great deal (Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales,
2004; Herrera and Minetti, 2007; Benfratello, Schiantarelli and Sembenelli, 2008;
Alessandrini, Presbitero and Zazzaro, 2009, 2010; Ferri and Murro, 2015). In our
empirical analysis, we therefore make use of two sets of measures of local bank-
ing structure: one set consists of the market share and number of branches of
local banks for each of Italy’s 103 NUTS3 regions in 1936, when the law that for
a long time limited geographical expansion became effective. The other set mea-
sures the same, but now for 1987, just before the removal of the law. We later
show that in the period in between 1936 and 1987, the Italian banking sector was
indeed highly stable, further strengthening our identification strategy.
Figure 1. : Identification
(a) market share of cooperative banks in
1936
(b) market share of SEs over the period
1998-2013
Note: The market share of cooperative banks has been calculated as the ratio of the cooperative banks divided
by the total banks in each NUTS3 region in 1936. The market share of SEs is calculated as the average number
of manufacturing firms with less than 10 employees divided the average number of all manufacturing firms
at the NUTS3 level over the period 1998-2013.
Second, we exploit the institutional composition of the Italian banking sector.
Lending to small, often relatively opaque borrowers, is a skill that some banks
are more likely to master than others. On the one hand, advances in the use of
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information technology to process hard information in lending have arguably
decreased the importance of physical proximity in lending (Petersen and Rajan,
2002). On the other hand, soft information continues to be a driver of relation-
ship lending (Bartoli et al., 2013; Petersen and Rajan, 1994), something large in-
stitutions typically do not excel at (Ferri and Murro, 2015; Peek and Rosengren,
1995). Moreover, gathering soft information is a costly and difficult to monitor
investment for local loan officers and can generate agency and incentive prob-
lems, in particular in complex, hierarchically organized banking organizations
(Alessandrini, Presbitero and Zazzaro, 2010; Berger et al., 2005). In the context
of the Italian banking market, therefore, we pay particular attention to the role
played by small cooperative banks. For 133 years, since the start of the so-called
Credito Cooperativo system, Italian cooperatives have been local, mutual and
non-profit. They exist all across Italy and claim to maintain values and an iden-
tity that enables them to provide a service to the local community that is partic-
ularly important for the firms we are interested in here. Hence, we focus on the
market share and number of branches of cooperative banks in our analysis.
Third, we need geographical and time variation, for both the local industrial
structure and the local banking market structure (post deregulation). After the
deregulation process in the early 90s the structure of the local banking system
has changed profoundly as the number of branches increased exponentially. In
addition, the Italian banking market went through an intensive process of merg-
ers and acquisitions, resulting in a decrease of the number of banks from more
than a thousand to less than 800, although banking groups are still relatively
small compared to international competitors (Bank of Italy, 2014). Meanwhile,
the number of firms with less than ten employees declined with 25.78% in the
period 1998-2013.2
Figure 1 provides a snapshot of the geographical variation. From the figure,
we can make two observations regarding the Italian banking sector. First, we
see that small banks are relatively important in various NUTS3 regions, both in
the south (e.g., the regions of Sicily, Calabria, Basilicata) and in the centre and
north (e.g., Tuscany, Lazio, Liguria). Second, we observe that the - historical
- share of cooperative banks coincides with a strong presence of SEs (with the
exception of NUTS3 regions in Sardegna, in Emilia-Romagna and Marche). SEs
abound in the south of Italy and on the islands, but are also plentiful in other
NUTS3 regions of the centre (Toscana, Umbria, Abruzzo) and north (Trentino-
Alto Adige, Valle d’Aosta). Large firms are mostly located in the NUTS3 regions
of Piemonte, Emilia Romagna, Lombardia, Friuli-Venezia Giulia.
Now that we have gathered enough data to explore the causal impact of lo-
cal banking structure on local industrial structure, we proceed one step further.
After all, at a time when the small, local bank is - for reasons ranging from tech-
nological progress, scale economies to empire building and deregulation - in-
creasingly at the fringes of the financial landscape, it is worthwhile finding out
2Source: ISTAT Asia database.
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just what makes these particular banks play an important role in shaping our lo-
cal economies. In order to find out more, in the next subsection, we put our own
twist on an established theory of financial system architecture to see if it can help
us identify the channels along which small, local banks can be of importance for
SEs.
B. Identifying channels
In order to really understand the way access to financing from small local
banks affects the fate of SEs in the same area, we need a more refined perspec-
tive. To get this perspective, we build on the work of Boot and Thakor (1997)
and introduce a model that explains the selection process by which borrowers
of different sizes are matched up with large and small banks. For firms, the key
role size plays in this matching process is that it affects the ability to credibly
signal (credit) quality. For banks, the key role of size is its impact on the extent
to which (credit) risks can be diversified, and therefore managed in the decision
to extend credit (or not).
WHY SHOULD SES BORROW FROM SMALL BANKS?
Banks of all sizes in the end have the same objective: to fund all firms that con-
stitute a positive net present value (NPV) for them. And banks of all sizes face, to
a large extent, the same amount of asymmetric information. Size, however, de-
termines what is the optimal strategy for a large and a small bank, respectively.
Whereas a large bank can use scale (in monitoring, and otherwise) to employ a
'cookie cutter' approach to lending that minimizes adverse selection by screening
borrowers, a small bank resorts to relationship lending and monitoring to mini-
mize moral hazard. Both approaches require a substantial investment: whereas
large banks have to invest in gathering and processing hard information, small
banks do the same with soft information. Consequently, banks tend to specialize
in either approach. Since there are scale economies in the former, it is favored by
large banks.
Along the same lines, a large firm that has a credit history and outside alterna-
tives (e.g., capital markets) will try to signal the quality of its projects to secure a
loan at a reasonable prices. At the same time, a SE that is opaque, has little or no
credit history and may engage in innovative (and risky) projects, cannot signal
its credit quality credibly yet, if it selects the right projects, is willing to subject
itself to ex-post monitoring.
The result then is a pairing of firms and banks that is very much in line with
Cole, Goldberg and White (2004), who find evidence of the coexistence of 'cookie
cutter' and 'character' and for a US setting show that borrowers select banks just
like banks select borrowers.
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THE ROLE OF ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
In line with Boot and Thakor (1997), we start by introducing three aspects of
asymmetric information.3 First, there is incomplete information about future
projects that is of relevance for firm valuation and firms’ investment decisions.
Second, there is the risk of ex-post asset substitution moral hazard that can affect
payoffs to banks. Third, there is uncertainty about the extent to which moral
hazard plays a role in borrowers’ decisions.
Borrowers choose between a good project and a bad project, both requiring an
investment of one, supplied by a bank. For the bank, the risk of lending consists
of three, related elements. The first element is the nature of the project. For a
good project, the payoff is Y with probability η, and 0 with probability 1− η. For
a bad project, the payoff is always 0, but firms receive a private rent N that is less
than ηY, and is thereby less attractive to banks, even if they manage to deprive
firms of these private rents.
The second element is asymmetric information between firm and bank, which
determines the room firms have to make (bad) project decisions. In the low-
flexibility state, firms can only choose good projects, whereas in the high-
flexibility state firms have the option of choosing a bad project. Each firm finds
itself in a low flexibility state with probability θ and in a high flexibility state
with a probability 1− θ, where θ ∈ (θ, θ) ⊂ (0, 1).
The third element is idiosyncratic risk, which takes the form of a firm-specific
realization of an environmental variable v (0, 1). It is the value of v that con-
nects the project risk with the degree of asymmetric information and affects the
borrowing choice. In essence, the realization of v can provide firms with the
resources to signal their project choice. This matters, since Y|v = 1 > Y|v = 0.4
It is therefore in the interest of banks for firms to choose the good project (if
they can choose the bad project as well), and to exert extra effort with good
projects. If banks can be sure enough that firms make these decisions, lending to
these firms is a healthy business for them.
THE ROLE OF SIZE
That brings us to the core of this part of our analysis: whether and how banks
manage to ensure that firms make these decisions depends on the size of firms
and the size of banks.
The role of the size of firms is fairly straightforward: at the outset, the degree
of asymmetric information is much higher when lending to SEs than it is when
3Throughout, we shall follow their notation, unless indicated otherwise.
4To see why that is the case, consider that in Boot and Thakor (1997), if v = 1 a firm can enhance the payoff
of a good project by exerting extra effort K = K¯ where K ∈ {0, K¯}. Once the firm does this, a good project will
have a payoff of Y + α with a probability η, and a payoff of α with a probability 1− η, where the realization of
α ∈ (0, 1) depends on v. There is a catch, of course: if the project is not successful, the firm is faced with a debt
overhang problem, since α ≺ 1.
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lending to large firms (Beck, Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2008; Berger and
Udell, 2006; Ferri and Murro, 2015).
The role of the size of banks is more complex. To understand that role, we first
need to understand the tools banks have at their disposal to deal with asymmet-
ric information in the lending process. We focus on two tools, each aimed at
minimizing a specific type of risk associated with asymmetric information.
The first tool is selection. When attempting to minimize adverse selection,
banks can try to learn more about the firms that approach them for a loan by
investing an amount M > 0. By spending M, these banks learn about the real-
ization of v, which provides them with crucial information to make a better loan
offer to firms with a v = 1, and thereby selecting more of these firms as their
borrowers, instead of firms with v = 0. In the original terminology of Boot and
Thakor (1997), these banks are now informed agents. The informational advan-
tage they have allows them to induce - through selection - firms to exert effort
when they should.
The second tool is monitoring. Banks can also spend M > 0 on monitoring
firms after they have granted them a loan. By monitoring firms, banks can force
firms to choose good projects when they should. The bank expects the following
profit on the loan.
(1) θη
[1+ λ∗M]
η
− 1 = θ [1+ λ∗M]− 1 < 0,
which in turn implies that it is convenient for a bank to invest in monitoring
and screening activities since an unmonitored project has a negative net present
value (NPV) (1− θ)ηY ≺ 1, while a monitored project has an NPV 0, ηY 
1+ λ∗M.
Summing up, banks can play a role in both aspects that improve borrowing
firms’ project outcomes. However, a single bank cannot improve its selection
and its monitoring. One reason for this is very intuitive: this would require
an investment of 2 × M, which would result in a loan rate that can easily be
undercut by some banks, who cater to specific types of firms (for example, large
firms with less asymmetric information who can credibly signal and therefore
pose no risk of adverse selection).
More relevant for the purpose of our analysis, the optimal bank size for both
tools is likely to be different. The minimum measure of monitoring agents
needed to deter the borrower from selecting a bad project is λ∗ < 1. In order
to ensure the collective of monitoring agents is devoid of free riding, its maxi-
mum feasible size is also limited.
Does the same hold for selection? Recall that selection is done based on v. Nei-
ther firm nor bank knows v before its realization and (for the bank) investing M,
although the firm knows the probability γ that v will be 1. However, contrary
to the monitoring process, where banks cannot spread moral hazard risk by di-
versifying, a bank that tries to lower adverse selection might be able to lower
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risk by diversifying - in particular if it can learn about v by dealing with similar
borrowers and projects in different markets.
A picture of two sizes of banks emerges, based on this analysis of bank lending.
One is a small bank that opts for monitoring relies on soft information, and as
Petersen and Rajan (2002) argue, is likely to be a local lender who collects soft
information on SEs over time and has an informational advantage over more
remote competitors who might not have the access to the same degree of local
information. The other is a large bank who is active on multiple markets, relies
on hard information and opts for a selection strategy.
What remains then, is a formal matching that shows why and when a small
(large) firm should opt for a small (large) bank when applying for credit.
CHANNELING FUNDS FROM BANKS TO FIRMS
Still putting our own spin on the financial system architecture described by
Boot and Thakor (1997), it is now time to put the pieces of the puzzle together
and find out what may connect small, local firms to small, local banks. In what
follows, we compare the cost of borrowing from a small, local bank to the cost of
borrowing from a large, multi-market bank. In doing so, we rely on a mechanism
that is explained in more detail in Boot and Thakor (1997): large firms with a
good project can signal their worthiness to banks in a way that is not replicable
to others (including SEs, even if they have a good project). However, SEs with a
good project survive the monitoring banks subject them to.
The final piece of the puzzle then lies in the difference between a firm’s ex ante
signaling and a bank’s ex post monitoring: whereas the signaling is done by a
single firm, the monitoring is done by a bank, a coalition of monitoring agents.
Hence, whereas both the signaling and the monitoring require a minimum in-
vestment, the monitoring also has its upper limits: a coalition (i.e., bank) that
is too large is too vulnerable to free riding. The end result is a situation where
small, local firms borrow from small, local banks, and large firms borrow from
large, multi-market banks.
To see how we arrive at this result, we start by establishing, from the model so
far, the expected loan interest rate for a small, local bank.5 Before we do so, we
introduce one more element into the model: we assume that the small bank can
prevent the choice of bad projects only with a probability ξ. In that case, if the
small bank earns zero profits, it charges:6
(2) iS =
(1+ λ∗M)
η [θ + {1− θ} ξ] ,
5From this point onwards, we occasionally change our notation from Boot and Thakor (1997). More im-
portantly, in our take on their model, a large, multi-market bank, is effectively placed in between the financial
institution in their model and the financial market.
6Equation (2) follows from the fact that iSη [θ + {1− θ} ξ] = 1+Λ∗M.
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which covers the monitoring cost M incurred by a bank in the post-lending stage,
and is lower if the risk of moral hazard is low (ξ is high) and it is likely that the
firm will do well (η is high).
The expected return, E(R), to the borrower of proceeding with the project de-
pends on whether the borrower gets a loan from a small bank or from a large
bank:
E(RS) = [θ + {1− θ} ξ] η [Y− iS] + [1− θ] [1− ξ] N(3a)
E(RL) =θ{(γ)E(RL|v = 1) + (1− γ)E(RL|v = 0)}+ (1− θ)N,(3b)
where E(RL) is the unconditional expected return from borrowing from a large
bank, and E(RS) is the unconditional expected return from borrowing from a
small bank. At this point remember that small, opaque borrowers below a
threshold value θ of observable quality opt for small bank financing, and bor-
rowers above that threshold value choose large bank financing. Hence, the
higher θ, the more the presence of SEs depends on the availability of small bank
financing. To see how θ depends on the market share of small banks σs, we pro-
ceed by combining equations (3a) and (3b) and following the derivations in the
Appendix obtain:
θ =σS
{
E(RS)− ξη (Y− iS)− (1− ξ) N
η (Y− iS)− ξη (Y− iS)− (1− ξ) N
}
+
(1− σS)
{
E(RL)− N
γE(RL|v = 1) + (1− γ)E(RL|v = 0)− N
}(4)
Therefore:
(5)
∂θ
∂σS
=
Small bank effect︷ ︸︸ ︷
unconditional return︷ ︸︸ ︷
E(RS) −
net benefits from monitoring︷ ︸︸ ︷
ξη (Y− iS)− (1− ξ) N
η (Y− iS)︸ ︷︷ ︸
return without
asymmetric information
− ξη (Y− iS)− (1− ξ) N︸ ︷︷ ︸
net benefits from monitoring
−
Large bank effect︷ ︸︸ ︷
unconditional return︷ ︸︸ ︷
E(RL) −
rents︷︸︸︷
N
E(RL)|v︸ ︷︷ ︸
return conditional
on economic outcome
− N︸︷︷︸
rents
where E(RL)|v = γE(RL|v = 1) + (1− γ)E(RL|v = 0).
Equation (5) is the core of our approach to identifying the channels along
which the presence of small banks affects the fate of SEs. Recall that a lower
threshold value for θ implies that there is a high probability that a firm finds it-
self in a high flexibility state, where it may depend on a small bank that monitors
for financing. Then consider the two ratios that make up the right-hand side of
equation (5).
The first ratio determines the relative need for small bank financing. As is to
be expected, the dependence on small banks increases with the unconditional
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expected return from borrowing from small banks (E(RS)). If asymmetric in-
formation is no issue, an increase in η(Y − iS) ensures that the dependence on
small banks decreases. Since 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1, we know from equation (A.1a) that
E(RS) ≤ η (Y− iS). Therefore the small bank effect is decreasing in the net ben-
efits (to the bank) from monitoring. Those benefits themselves increase in the
probability of preventing a bad project (ξ), requiring additional monitoring costs
(M) and boosting monitoring capacity (λ).7 If rents (N) increase, net monitoring
benefits decrease, lowering the likelihood of obtaining a loan from small banks.
Likewise, if the payoff (Y) for a good project increases.
The second ratio determines the relative need for large bank financing. As
is the case for small banks, higher rents decrease the likelihood of obtaining a
loan from large banks. The effect is even stronger here, since large banks cannot
prevent high-flexibility borrowers from engaging in riskier projects to pursue
private rents. At the same time, the bigger the difference between the offer a
large bank can make, based on the signal it received, to firms in a good state
(v = 1) and the unconditional offer, assuming the bank cannot use this informa-
tion, the more large banks will be able to steal borrowers from small banks, thus
lowering the latter’s share of the market.
Of course, each borrowing firm, large or small, should take a loan from the
bank where the expect return that this firm makes on its investment financed
with this loan is the highest. Table 1 summarizes how equations (3a) and (3b)
inform us about the factors that affect the likelihood that a (good) SE borrows
from a small bank.
C. Empirical strategy
Now that we have developed our identification strategy and have introduced
the factors that can strengthen the impact the presence of small banks has on the
share of SEs in a NUTS3 region, it is time to discuss our empirical strategy. We
can test for the impact of the presence of small, local banks with the following
two specifications:
MSSEit =b0 + bMSSB,1936 MS
SB,1936
i + γC
′
+ ε it;(6a)
MSSEit =b0 + bMSSB,1936 MS
SB,1936
i + bXXit + bX MS
SB,1936
i × Xit ++γC
′
+ ε it,(6b)
where MSSEit is the market share of small firms in NUTS3 region i at time t,
MSSB,1936 is the historical market share (in 1936) of small banks in the same re-
gion at the same time, Xit is as vector of variables that follows directly from our
discussion of the channels through which the latter affect the former, and C
′
is a
vector of demand-side control variables that can explain the number of new and
existing small businesses. In particular, we include the level of resident popula-
tion in each NUTS3 region as suggested by Keeble and Walker (1994), as well as
7To see why, refer to equation (2).
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a variable to measure the geographical size of each NUTS3 region to control for
the potential degree of spatial concentration of local markets.
Equation (6a) follows directly from our identification strategy: bMSSB,1936 mea-
sures the impact of (historical) small bank presence on the market share of SEs in
a NUTS3 region. From equation (6b), we can infer the channels along which the
former affects the latter, i.e., ∂MSSEit /∂MS
SB,1936
i = bMSSB,1936 + bXXit. As a result,
the full model is as follows:
MSSEit =β0 + βMSSB,1936i
MSSB,1936i︸ ︷︷ ︸
Identification [+]
+ βMSSB,1936i ×θMS
SB,1936
i × θ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Project choice [−]
+
βMSSB,1936i ×v MS
SB,1936
i × v︸ ︷︷ ︸
Performance [−]
+ βMSSB,1936i ×RM MS
SB,1936
i × R︸ ︷︷ ︸
Loan rate [+/−]
+
bMSSB,1936i ×N MS
SB,1936
i × N︸ ︷︷ ︸
Private rent [−]
+ βMSSB,1936i ×λMS
SB,1936
i × λ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Minimum size [−]
+
βMSSB,1936i ×M MS
SB,1936
i ×M︸ ︷︷ ︸
Monitoring cost [+/−]
+ βMSSB,1936i ×Y MS
SB,1936
i ×Y︸ ︷︷ ︸
Project payoff [−]
+
βMSSB,1936i ×ηMS
SB,1936
i × η︸ ︷︷ ︸
Chance of success [−]
+ε
(7)
In the next section, we describe in more detail how we measure each of the
items included in Equation (7).
III. Data
A. SEs and small banks
We start with a description of our two key variables of interest. First, we dis-
cuss the presence of small enterprises. Then, we explain how we account for the
historical presence of small banks.
We measure MSSEit in several ways. First, we use MS
SE,micro
it to account for the
share of micro manufacturing firms, calculated as the ratio of firms with less
than 10 employees divided by the total number of manufacturing firms for each
year and NUTS3 region.8 Second, we use MSSE,spit to account for the share of sole
proprietorship firms in the same manner. Since for these firms the entrepreneur
is the owner and personally liable when the firm suffers losses, private rent is-
sues can be more severe than for other types of firms. Taken together, these firms
account on average for about 55 percent of all firms in manufacturing in Italy.9
8Source: https://www.bancaditalia.it/compiti/vigilanza/albi-elenchi/index.html.
9Source: ISTAT Asia database.
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Finally, in a robustness analysis, we use MSSE,high−techit , the market share of sole
proprietorships active in innovative sectors, to assess whether what we are pick-
ing up is indeed the size effect of SEs rather than the fact that these may be the
most innovative firms.10
Important for our analysis, the 1936 banking law attributed a specific geo-
graphical area of competence to each type of credit institution (Minetti, Murro
and Paiella, 2015). In particular, cooperatives banks could only open branches
in the NUTS3 regions where they were already present in 1936. In contrast, sav-
ing banks could expand within the regional boundaries where they operated in
1936 (NUTS2 level), while national banks were allowed to open branches in the
main cities. Cooperative banks are small and focused on local markets and they
lend themselves well for our research hypothesis. For MSSB,1936i , we take the
market share of cooperative banks in 1936, defined as the number of cooperative
banks divided by the total number of banks. As an alternative, we use MSSB,1987i ,
the share of of cooperative banks in 1987, just before the 1936 banking law was
renounced.11
B. Channels and additional control variables
To capture the different channels along which the presence of small, local
banks can have an impact on the share of SEs, we need to proxy each of the
different elements we introduced before. We describe our approach for each of
the channels in Table (1). As control variables, we take into account the popula-
tion and geographical dimension of each NUTS3 region. In particular, Pop is the
logarithm of the population in each NUTS3 region and Area is the logarithm of
KM2 per NUTS3 regions.
Of all the channels, the one that requires a more elaborate explanation is the
cost of borrowing, R. We measure R by using a measure of competition. In
particular, we make use of the Lerner Index which measures the extent to which
banks in a region i at time t are able to set a price (Pit) above their marginal cost
MCit:
(8) Rit = (Pit −MCit)/Pit,
where MCit is calculated from a translog cost frontier estimated at the NUTS3
level, with a single output, loans, two input prices (deposit and labor) and a
trend variable to capture technological progress.12 In estimating the translog cost
10Following Ughetto (2008), we classify a firm as a high-tech firm if it belongs to the following industrial
sectors: chemicals and drugs (Ateco 24), mechanical machinery (Ateco 29), computer equipment (Ateco 30),
electronic components and machinery (Ateco 31), communication equipment (Ateco 32), medical, optical, and
precision equipment (Ateco 33), and transportation equipment (Ateco 34-35). Source: ISTAT: Asia database;
Infocamere: Movimpresa.
11Unfortunately, the available data do not allow us to measure the market share based on total assets or
total loan volume.
12We estimate a fixed effects frontier model, with a time varying decay for the inefficiency term and regional
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Table 1—: Should a good SE borrow from a small bank?
Variable (effect) Explanation Measurement
θ (−) Probability of a
low flexibility
state
Since a large bank can observe bor-
rower’s initial choice, probability
that its borrower will invest in bad
project is lower.
Market share of medium-large
banks in each NUTS3 region, calcu-
lated as the ratio of the number of
their branches (or banks) divided
the total number of branches (or
banks) in the same NUTS3 regions.
v (−) Environmental
variable
Reflects the capability of repaying
the loans received from a bank.
The ratio of the growth of em-
ployees of SEs in manufacturing
for each NUTS3 region to the total
growth of the employees in manu-
facturing at the NUTS3 level.
R (+/−) Cost of bor-
rowing
Large banks can promote competi-
tion in retail loans because of the
access to low-cost wholesale funds.
As a result, consumer loan rates de-
crease as the large bank’s shares in-
crease (Park and Pennacchi, 2009).
Based on this view, the presence of
large banks could promote compe-
tition. On the other hand, large
banks compete with each other si-
multaneously in more than one ge-
ographical and/or product market.
The number of markets shared by
banks may foster incentives for tacit
collusion, thereby weakening com-
petition (Edwards, 1955).
The Lerner Index to measure the lo-
cal market competition in the loan
market (see equation 8).
N (−) Private rents Likely to be high as the opacity of
borrowers increases and it is diffi-
cult to monitor and measure its out-
puts.
The market share of high-tech man-
ufacturing firms, calculated as the
number of high tech firms at the
NUTS3 level divided by the total
number of manufacturing firms at
the NUTS3 level.
λ (−) Monitoring ca-
pacity
Reduction of asymmetric informa-
tion between borrower and lender.
In these circumstances, a SE is more
likely to get funds also from a large
bank.
The logarithm of the minimum
amount of total assets among all the
banks with the headquarters in a
given NUTS3 region.
M (+/−) Monitoring
and informa-
tion acquisi-
tion cost
For small banks, an increase in
M increases monitoring costs, for
large banks it increases the informa-
tion acquisition cost.
Non-performing loans over per-
forming loans at the NUTS3 level.
Y (−) Successful
project payoff
Related to the profitability of bor-
rowers. If a project has a high pay-
off, it is more likely that a SE will
get funds from a large bank
Net entry rate (new manufacturing
micro firms minus the dead micro
firms) divided by the total firms for
each NUTS3 region, considering all
the industrial sectors.
η (−) Probability of a
good payoff
A measure of the performance of
the industrial sector, which can af-
fect the probability of a borrower
repeating the performance during
the next period.
Growth of value added per person
at the NUTS3 level.
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frontier, we define the price of deposit as the ratio of interest expenses and total
deposits, while the price of labor is defined as the labor expenses per employee.13
Finally, total cost (TCit) is the sum of interest expenses and labor costs. MCit is
derived from the translog cost function as ∂ ln TCit/∂ ln Qit.
(9) MCit = (
TCit
Qit
) ∗ (β0 + βl ln Qit + β2 ln w1it + β3 ln w2it + β4t),
where TCit is total cost, Qit is total loans; w1it (price of labor) and w2it (price
of deposits) are the input prices, and t is the time trend. We substitute MCit in
equation (8), where we use the local short-term interest rate on loans as the price
of loans.14
C. Data Sources
The dataset we build borrows from five different sources: the Bank of Italy, the
Italian Banking Association (ABI), the Italian National Institute of Statistics (IS-
TAT), Eurostat and Movimpresa. The latter provides data on birth/death rates
for businesses run by InfoCamere on behalf of Unioncamere in the archives of
all the Italian Chambers of Commerce. The Bank of Italy provides historical
information on bank branches in 1936, 1987 and for the sample period 1998-
2013. The Italian Banking Association provides the remainder of the bank-level
variables. Eurostat collects data on patent applications to the EPO by NUTS3
regions. Finally, ISTAT and Movimpresa collect data on local market structure
and the demography of industrial firms. The result is a data set that covers 103
Italian NUTS3 regions over the period 1998-2013, with the addition of the his-
torical share of small, cooperative banks in 1936 and 1987.15 Table 2 reports the
descriptives statistics of all the variables included in equation 6b.
Before we proceed to our empirical analysis, it is good to take stock of the
coverage of our data. Table 2 shows that SEs represent almost 85% of firms in
manufacturing (MSSE,microit ). Moreover, more than half of these firms are sole
proprietorships (MSSE,spit ). Meanwhile, at present small, local banks are indeed
small and present throughout Italy, as is clear from the low mean and standard
deviation for λ, the minimum size of small banks in a local market. Overall, the
Italian banking sector is of a relatively modest size, consisting of 60% mutual
and cooperative banks and with total financial assets equal to 2.6 times GDP in
2014, compared to 3.1 times GDP in Germany, and 4.0 in France (Bank of Italy,
2014).
fixed effects. More details are available upon request.
13Whereas the former varies from region to region, the latter cannot, since labor expenses for the financial
sector are only available at the national level. Note however, that our regional fixed effects can absorb regional
differences in labor expenses.
14Note that the data on interest rates are available at the NUTS2 level for the period under investigation.
15The start of our sample period is restricted by the availability of interest rates on loans and deposits as of
1998.
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Table 2—: Descriptive statistics
MS36<median MS36>median
Variables Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
MSSE,micro 0.847 0.060 0.838 0.056 0.853 0.063
MSSE,sp 0.550 0.092 0.534 0.092 0.569 0.109
MSSE,high−tech 0.110 0.034 0.111 0.034 0.110 0.036
Patents/Pop 3.469 1.352 3.735 1.278 3.237 1.372
MSSB,1936 0.212 0.184 0.061 0.056 0.344 0.151
MSSB,1987 0.105 0.139 0.059 0.088 0.145 0.162
θ1 0.589 0.170 0.573 0.205 0.604 0.148
θ2 0.603 0.176 0.588 0.206 0.617 0.145
v 0.151 2.603 0.219 2.279 0.110 2.448
R 0.591 0.184 0.604 0.192 0.562 0.185
N 0.223 0.076 0.233 0.068 0.218 0.072
λ 4.439 1.810 4.167 2.142 4.628 1.409
M 0.023 0.020 0.019 0.017 0.024 0.020
Y 0.006 0.014 0.006 0.013 0.007 0.016
η 0.021 0.036 0.024 0.037 0.022 0.036
Pop 6.023 0.708 6.059 0.818 5.992 0.593
Area 0.884 0.635 0.923 0.642 0.849 0.625
Note: MSSE,micro : market share of micro manufacturing firms: MSSE,sp: market share of sole proprietor-
ship manufacturing firms; MSSE,high−tech: market share of sole proprietorships active in innovative sectors;
Patents/Pop: logarithm of number of patents per million inhabitants; MSSB,1936 and MSSB,1987: market share of
cooperative banks in 1936 and 1987; θ1 and θ2: market share of large and medium-sized banks with over EUR9
billion in assets, based on their share in the total number of banks’ branches (low flexibility state), using either
NUTS3-level data (θ1) or branch-level data (θ2), source: Bank of Italy; v: the ratio of the growth of employees
for each location and size of firms to the total growth of the employees at the NUTS3 level (environmental
variable), source: ISTAT Asia database; η: growth rate of the value added per person, source: ISTAT and Is-
tituto Guglielmo Tagliacarne; N: market share of high-tech firms (rents): source, ISTAT; λ: the logarithm of
the minimum size of a bank in a NUTS3 region (Monitoring), source: Association of Italian banks (ABI); M:
non-performing loans over performing loans (Monitoring cost), source: Bank of Italy; Y: net entry rate (new
manufacturing micro firms minus the dead micro firms) divided by the total firms (successful project payoff),
source: ISTAT Asia database; R: monopoly market power in the loan markets (Lerner Index), sources: Bank of
Italy, ISTAT; Pop: the logarithm of the population in each NUTS3 region, source: ISTAT; Area: the logarithm
of km2 per NUTS3 region.
Table 2 also shows that the historical market share of small and local banks
was in fact rather low, at 20% in 1936 and 11% in 1987, respectively. However,
the presence of local banks was geographically uneven as indicated by the differ-
ences in mean values in columns (3) and (5). With the liberalization to the open-
ing of branches in 1987, the number of branches of medium and large banks, θ1
and θ2, increased. The main difference between the two measures of θ is that
whereas the former is calculated using NUTS3-level data (θ1) the latter is based
on branch-level data (θ2), and therefore also includes opened and/or closed dur-
ing the year. As a consequence their average market share is equal to 60% on
average for the period from 1998 to 2013. Nevertheless, market power is rela-
tively high in most markets, as evidenced by the high values (and low medians)
for R, the Lerner index. Meanwhile, Table 2 captures the large differences in
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NUTS3 regions’ structural and economic characteristics, with high standard de-
viations for net entry rates (Y), employee growth (v) and non-performing loans
(M). Finally, Italian NUTS3 regions vary considerably in their size (Area) and
populations density (Pop).
IV. Empirical Results
We first study the straightforward, causal impact of the historical local bank-
ing structure on the market share of SEs. Next, we examine the various channels
that have strengthened or weakened this impact. Subsequently, we investigate
whether its indeed the market share of SEs that is explained, and not the share
of innovative firms, that happen to be small. Finally, we present a simple coun-
terfactual analysis to demonstrate how the historical local banking structure has
shaped Italy’s industrial structure as we know it today.
A. Measuring the causal impact
We start by analyzing the causal impact of the local banking structure in 1936
and 1987 on the market share of SEs for the period from 1998 to 2013. We adopt
a geographical perspective, contrary to the studies that have devoted their atten-
tion to the effect of bank size or lending technologies on the access to credit of
small businesses (Alessandrini, Presbitero and Zazzaro, 2009; Bartoli et al., 2013;
Berger et al., 2005; Berger and Black, 2011; Ferri and Murro, 2015).
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 3 report the results of estimating equation (6a),
where the key righthand-side variables are MSSB,1936 and MSSB,1987, respec-
tively. We include time fixed effects to account for all unobservable time-variant
NUTS3-level specific factors. We also control for the population density and
geographical size of each NUTS3 region. Notably, we find a positive and signif-
icant impact of both MSSB,1936 and MSSB,1987 on the market share of SEs in each
NUTS3 region.
As a robustness test, we replicate this straightforward causal test in Table 4,
where the dependent variable is now the market share of sole proprietorship
manufacturing firms. For those firms the impact of the market share of small
banks in 1936 and 1987 is even stronger. In particular, a one standard deviation
increase of MSSB,1936 is associated with a 3% (0.184*0.151) increase of the market
share of sole proprietorship manufacturing firms, while a one standard deviation
increase of MSSB,1987 is associated with a 2% (0.139*0.132) increase of the mar-
ket share of sole proprietorship manufacturing firms.16Furthermore, whereas we
can so far explain between 20.0% (MSSB,1987) and 24.0% (MSSB,1936) of total vari-
ance in the market shares of sole proprietorships, we can only explain between
8.9% (MSSB,1987) and 12.1% (MSSB,1936) of total variance in the market shares of
16In our initial estimates in columns (1) and (2) in Table 3, the comparable impact on the share of SEs is
equal to 1.3% in the case of MSSB,1936 and almost 1% in the case of MSSB,1987.
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SEs as a whole. Meanwhile, the share of SEs is higher in larger NUTS3 regions,
but lower when population density is high.
Our findings are consistent with the views of Berger, Rosen and Udell (2007)
that it is the share of small banks present in a market that matters most for the
access to credit of small businesses. We also find support for the views of Arthur
(1986) and Krugman (1991), who argue that industry locations and agglomer-
ation economies today are a consequence of historical ‘accidents’ - in this case
the 1936 law - in a distant past. Indeed, when the geographical restrictions im-
posed by the 1936 law were imposed, the local market characteristics and in-
dustrial needs were hardly taken into account. Rather, they were the result of
previous waves of bank creation and the Italian unification. Paradoxically, these
geographical restrictions have indeed contributed to shaping the industrial land-
scape that we observe across the NUTS3 regions nowadays.
Our findings also relate to a broader palette of results commonly found in the
economic geography literature. We show that the local banking market structure
matters across industries, as small banks’ role in financing intermediate demand
and help forge inter-sectoral linkages can help explain the establishment and
success of small firms in certain regions.17 Consistent with Hirschman (1858)
and recent studies in economic geography (Meliciani and Savona, 2014; Raspe
and Van Oort, 2006; Van Oort, 2007), we provide evidence that firms concentrate
where their clients or suppliers are located as the geographical proximity and
co-location of firms extends beyond the existence of urbanization externalities
and can also be driven by supply relationships. Capital is a significant factor
of production, contributing to profit and growth of SEs, and the allocation of its
funding connects small banks and small firms in an enduring manner, especially
in Italy, where bank funding is still the main source of financing available to most
firms.
In the next section, we discuss the channels that either strengthen or weaken
the impact of the historical existence of small banks in these local markets.
B. Measuring the importance of the channels
In columns (3) to (6) of Table 3 we have estimated equation 6b, exploring in
detail how each of the channels we identified earlier affects the impact of histor-
ical small bank presence. Again, we use two different versions for the historical
small bank market shares: MSSB,1936 in columns (3) and (4), and MSSB,1936 in
columns (5) and (6). We also use our two measures for large bank presence, θ1
(in columns (3) and (5)) and θ2 (columns (4) and (6)).
From Table 3, we learn that two channels are dominant: private rents N and
banks’ monitoring capacity λ both lower the impact of the historical share of
small banks on today’s share of small firms. The latter suggests that as banks
increase in size they become better at recouping the costs of monitoring activi-
17See Rosenthal and Strange (2004), Rosenthal and Strange (2006) for a discussion on this issue.
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ties. This implies less funding for firms that are opaque and small, including the
small high-tech firms that we use as a proxy for N.
These findings shed light on recent policy changes by the Bank of Italy. In
response to the changes recommend by the recent Banking Recovery and Reso-
lution Directive and the Single Resolution Mechanism, it has advocated a con-
solidation process among cooperative banks, possibly even leading to a single
cooperative banking holding company. As it stands, the small banks we focus
on carry a relatively high percentage of non-performing loans, and are said to
often suffer from a lack of effective internal governance. Our results suggest,
however, that creating one large cooperative bank can also have its downsides:
a loss of focus on lending locally and the ability to serve small enterprises.
In the current system, not all lending by small banks is done in the same man-
ner, as becomes clear when we dive into some of the other channels. The cost of
borrowing R, the probability of a good payoff η and a successful project payoff
Y, related to the profitability of borrowers: all have the expected sign in some
specifications, but never consistently. Increasing the probability of success of a
project reduces the asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers. As
a consequence, the importance of acquiring soft information in order to provide
a line of credit to a client declines as the project is likely to have a positive payoff.
Therefore, the advantage attributed to small banks in managing soft information
appears in this context to be less relevant in the lending decisions. This means
that medium and large banks represent a valid alternative to small banks for
small businesses to get funds. Meanwhile, our finding that η and v are signifi-
cantly negative in half of our specifications suggests that, in a healthy economic
environment the relevance of small banks for the growth of small enterprises
decreases.
We find no evidence that the cost of monitoring or information acquisition M
and the probability of being in a low flexibility state θ, because of the dominance
of large banks, play a role in explaining the geographic variance in the share
of small enterprises through their impact on the lasting effect of the historical
small banks market share. Directly, both variables significantly affect the share of
SEs, but in a positive manner. Hence, our findings corroborate what has shown
before by e.g. Berger et al. (2007), Coccorese (2009) and Hannan and Prager
(2009): large multi-market banks improve the lending conditions for SEs as they
promote competition in retail lending through the access to low-cost wholesale
funds (Park and Pennacchi, 2009).
Our results remain qualitatively similar when - in Table 4 - we consider the
market share of sole proprietorship manufacturing firms instead of our broader
definition of SEs used so far. Sole proprietorship manufacturing firms are usu-
ally classified as family businesses by many scholars (Astrachan and Shanker,
2003). As explained byBopaiah (1998), family-owned businesses tend to receive
greater availability of credit as they are seen by lenders as having fewer moral
hazard problems. Voordeckers and Steijvers (2006) find that family businesses
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Table 3—: Main Results with Market Share of SEs as dependent variable
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
MSSB,1936 (x) 0.071*** 0.112*** 0.121***
[0.008] [0.036] [0.037]
MSSB,1987 (x) 0.051*** 0.456*** 0.514***
[0.010] [0.069] [0.071]
x · θ1 0.044 -0.041
[0.041] [0.062]
x · θ2 0.050 -0.092
[0.041] [0.067]
x · v -0.004** -0.005*** 0.000 0.000
[0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003]
x · R -0.018 -0.038 -0.139** -0.158***
[0.030] [0.030] [0.054] [0.055]
x · N -0.232** -0.259** -1.374*** -1.432***
[0.115] [0.117] [0.159] [0.160]
x · λ -0.008** -0.007** -0.013** -0.015***
[0.004] [0.004] [0.005] [0.005]
x · M -0.042 0.020 0.856 1.161*
[0.405] [0.414] [0.573] [0.605]
x · Y -1.632*** -1.764*** 0.149 0.592
[0.375] [0.405] [0.732] [0.837]
x · η -0.147 -0.069 -0.568** -0.558**
[0.196] [0.198] [0.272] [0.284]
θ1 0.049*** 0.058***
[0.009] [0.008]
θ2 0.056*** 0.071***
[0.011] [0.009]
v 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001 0.001
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
R -0.147*** -0.144*** -0.136*** -0.133***
[0.012] [0.012] [0.010] [0.009]
N -0.123*** -0.128*** -0.123*** -0.130***
[0.028] [0.028] [0.021] [0.021]
λ 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
M 0.454*** 0.368*** 0.343*** 0.239***
[0.117] [0.113] [0.105] [0.095]
Y 1.192*** 1.229*** 0.755*** 0.692***
[0.166] [0.187] [0.161] [0.168]
η 0.158*** 0.127** 0.165*** 0.146***
[0.063] [0.063] [0.054] [0.055]
Pop -0.018*** -0.019*** -0.003 -0.004 -0.002 -0.003
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Area 0.026*** 0.022*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.008***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Constant 0.923*** 0.943*** 0.914*** 0.907*** 0.912*** 0.904***
[0.014] [0.015] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013]
Observations 1,648 1,648 1,648 1,545 1,648 1,545
R-squared 0.121 0.089 0.411 0.409 0.427 0.428
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4—: Robustness Test: Market share of Sole Proprietorship Manufacturing
Firms & Channels
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
MSSB,1936 (x) 0.151*** 0.183*** 0.184***
[0.013] [0.060] [0.060]
MSSB,1987 (x) 0.132*** 0.682*** 0.723***
[0.017] [0.115] [0.120]
x · θ1 0.116** 0.190**
[0.059] [0.091]
x · θ2 0.136** 0.146
[0.057] [0.093]
x · v -0.009*** -0.010*** 0.004 0.003
[0.003] [0.003] [0.006] [0.006]
x · R -0.167*** -0.190*** -0.210** -0.235***
[0.049] [0.050] [0.085] [0.087]
x · N -0.134 -0.171 -2.520*** -2.522***
[0.170] [0.173] [0.278] [0.281]
x · λ -0.009** -0.009* -0.016* -0.017*
[0.005] [0.005] [0.009] [0.009]
x · M 0.425 0.536 0.225 0.410
[0.714] [0.723] [0.894] [0.939]
x · Y -2.405*** -2.398*** 0.285 1.200
[0.659] [0.695] [1.179] [1.265]
x · η 0.237 0.325 -0.686 -0.793*
[0.302] [0.304] [0.455] [0.449]
θ1 0.041*** 0.046***
[0.013] [0.011]
θ2 0.062***
[0.013]
v 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.000 0.000
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
R -0.247*** -0.241*** -0.262*** -0.257***
[0.018] [0.019] [0.016] [0.017]
N -0.272*** -0.278*** -0.205*** -0.219***
[0.038] [0.039] [0.031] [0.031]
λ 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
M 0.551*** 0.387** 0.564*** 0.403**
[0.191] [0.180] [0.195] [0.179]
Y 1.609*** 1.575*** 0.962*** 0.793***
[0.289] [0.314] [0.287] [0.294]
η 0.111 0.083 0.213*** 0.208***
[0.093] [0.093] [0.085] [0.085]
Pop -0.032*** -0.035*** 0.000 -0.003 0.000 -0.002
[0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004]
Area 0.050*** 0.042*** 0.022*** 0.021*** 0.018*** 0.018***
[0.003] [0.004] [0.003] [0.004] [0.003] [0.004]
Constant 0.716*** 0.758*** 0.714*** 0.707*** 0.720*** 0.710***
[0.024] [0.024] [0.022] [0.022] [0.021] [0.021]
Observations 1,648 1,648 1,648 1,545 1,648 1,545
R-squared 0.240 0.200 0.507 0.500 0.514 0.509
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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offer a higher degree of collateral/commitment protection only when there is a
low amount of banking competition. This could explain why the interaction of
MSSB,1936 and MSSB,1987 with θ1 is significantly positive for sole proprietorship
manufacturing firms. However, Bopaiah (1998) find that family firms do not
benefit from lower interest rates. Indeed, as banks experience an increase in their
monopoly market power, the joint effect of the cost of borrowing R and MSSB,1936
and MSSB,1987 is negatively and significantly related to the market share of sole
proprietorship manufacturing firms.
C. Small and opaque, or simply innovative?
In our analysis so far, we have consistently made the case that the key distin-
guishing feature that sets small enterprises apart from the rest is, quite simply,
their size. As a result of their small size, SEs are opaque, which means that a
different lending strategy, aimed more at monitoring, is required to successfully
lend to them, or so the argument goes. In this subsection we address a possible
confounding factor: small enterprises can be opaque because of their size, but
also because they tend to invest in innovative projects that are difficult to mon-
itor and uncertain in their outcomes. Consequently, innovative firms are likely
to suffer from limited access to credit compared to less innovative firms, and
small firms are in this position because they are more innovative than their large
counterparts, and not because of their size.
For this additional analysis, we therefore employ two different measures
of innovation at the NUTS3 level: the number of sole proprietorships ac-
tive in innovative sectors divided by the total number of sole proprietorships
(MSSE,high−tech); and the logarithm of the number of patents per million inhabi-
tants at the NUTS3 level (Patents/Pop).
While Patents/Pop is a conventional innovation statistic in the literature,
MSSE,high−tech is related to the industrial composition at the NUTS3 level. For
MSSE,high−tech, following Ughetto (2008), we classify a manufacturing firm as
high-tech if it belongs to the following sectors: chemicals and drugs (Ateco 24),
mechanical machinery (Ateco 29), computer equipment (Ateco 30), electronic
components and machinery (Ateco 31), communication equipment (Ateco 32),
medical, optical, and precision equipment (Ateco 33), and transportation equip-
ment (Ateco 34-35). This criterium is applied for the years 1998 and 2007, taking
in account the differences in terms of classification in the economic sector over
the time period analysed18. After 2007, a new classification of economic activities
was introduced, Ateco 2007, which differs from the previous one. Consequently,
for the years 2008-2013 we use different codes which, however, refer to similar
economic activities: Ateco 20, Ateco 28, Ateco 33, Ateco 26, Ateco 27 and Ateco
30.
18We specifically exclude code 35.2, which presents a difference between two classifications, Ateco 1991 and
Ateco 2002.
22
Table 5—: Opacity. Dependent Variable: Market Share of Sole Proprietorship
and High-Tech Manufacturing Firms, and Numbers of Patents per Person
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES MSSE,high−tech Patents/Pop (+) MSSE,high−tech Patents/Pop (=)
MSSB,1936 -0.015*** -1.901***
[0.004] [0.198]
MSSB,1987 -0.010** -2.074***
[0.005] [0.215]
Pop -0.001 0.551*** 0.000 0.600***
[0.001] [0.049] [0.001] [0.054]
Area -0.010*** -0.566*** -0.010*** -0.464***
[0.002] [0.045] [0.002] [0.049]
Constant 0.124*** 0.912*** 0.120*** 0.343
[0.008] [0.298] [0.008] [0.321]
Observations 1,545 1,442 1,545 1,442
R-squared 0.163 0.191 0.158 0.169
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. (+) Data available until 2012.
In Table 5, we repeat our initial simple causality test. From the Table, we can
infer that our findings so far can indeed be attributed to the size of SEs: whereas
MSSB,1936 and MSSB,1987 now both have a significantly negative effect on both
the share of high-tech firms and the innovativeness of the different regions.
D. What would Italy look like without small local banks?
To finalize our empirical analysis, we consider the counterfactual, and ask
what Italy would look like without small local banks. Often, the economic ge-
ography of Italy is considered only as a juxtaposition between the north and the
south. The analysis presented here demonstrates that this is a clear oversimplifi-
cation. From Figure 1b, we already observed that whereas the presence of small
enterprises is indeed notable in many regions in the south, the same can be said
for the north.
In Figure 2, we show what Italy would look like without the banking law
we made use of in our identification strategy. To do so, we take the estimated
coefficients in columns (3) and (5) of 3, and use them to predict the share of SEs
in each region, with one noted difference: instead of using the actual value of
the historical share of small banks, we replace it with its median historical - as if
there had been no historical difference between the presence of small banks. Of
course, this is an oversimplification, but the results, depicted in Figures 2a and
2b, respectively, serve to illustrate what might have been without the historical
diversity in the local banking markets.
From the figures, we observe that the presence of SEs would have indeed been
much more equal across the nation. Notably, the dominance of SEs in the centre
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Figure 2. : Counterfactual Analysis
(a) Share of Micro Firms-1936 (b) Share of Micro Firms-1987
Note: The share of SEs is estimated by substituting in equation 7 the coefficient that we have estimated in Table
3 over the period 1998-2013. We then substitute in equation 7 the median value of MSSB,1936 and MSSB,1987.
of the country is gone once we get rid of the underlying variance in the historical
share of small local banks. Generally speaking, the south would in fact have -
in relative terms - a slightly higher concentration in SEs than we find in practice.
However despite the economic boom in the fifties and sixties, and the increase
of economic and social inequalities between the north and the south of Italy, the
industrial economic structure of the entire country would have been much more
homogenous.
Would these changes to the industrial landscape be important from an eco-
nomic viewpoint? To answer this question, we examine the impact of the mar-
ket share of SEs and medium-large firms on the productivity of manufacturing
at the NUTS3 level. We include time and NUTS3-fixed effects to account for un-
observable time-variant and regional factors. As a measure of manufacturing
productivity, we use the logarithm of the value added of manufacturing divided
by the number of employees in manufacturing s (Man f VA).19
Table 6 shows the results of this analysis. The market share of SEs, MSSE,microit ,
is positively and significantly related to Man f VA. Meanwhile, the share of
medium-large firms, MSMLit , is negatively and significantly related to Man f VA.
From an economic viewpoint, a one standard deviation increase of MSSE,microit
is associated with a 45% increase of Man f VA, while a one standard deviation
19 Man f VA has a mean value equal to 140.8255 and standard deviation of 272.9634.
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increase of MSMLit
20 is associated with a 1% decrease of Man f VA.
Table 6—: Value Added of the Manufacturing Industry and the Market Share of
SEs and Medium− LargeFirms
Man f VA Man f VA
MSSE,microit 7.020***
[1.516]
MSMLit -28.480***
[8.327]
Pop 0.604 0.632**
[0.363] [0.222]
Constant -3.746 2.749*
[3.194] [1.231]
Observations 1,648 1,648
R-squared 0.284 0.357
NUTS3 region fixed effects Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
Note: Man f VA is the logarithm of manufacturing value added per number of employees of the
manufacturing sector at the NUTS3 level. MSSE,microit is the market share of small manufacturing firms with
less than 10 employees. MSMLit is the market share of medium-large manufacturing firms with more than 50
employees.
Summing up, our analysis in this final part of our results section suggests that
preserving the diversity in local banking markets, in business models and the
size of banks, can have important benefits.
V. Conclusion
This paper investigates to what extent the configuration of manufacturing and
specifically the geographical distribution of small enterprises is determined by
the market share of small banks. We show that without the historical presence of
small, local banks, Italy’s manufacturing landscape would look very differently.
Small banks can help small enterprises flourish, as long as they have sufficient
monitoring capacity and the firms they lend to are not able to capture too much
in rents.
Using a detailed database on firms and banks for the Italian market from 1998-
2013, we paint a simple, but very powerful picture: we show that the structure of
the Italian banking system in 1936 - before the liberalization process in the early
1990s - is an important factor that has shaped the current size and distribution
of small enterprises in local markets.
Policy makers should be aware that a further consolidation of banking sectors
and increases in the sizes of banks changes the way the latter do business in ways
that can harm the growth of small enterprises and sole proprietorship firms.
20The mean is 0.019 and mean 0.011
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The result is a manufacturing eco-system that is less diverse, both locally - with
the presence of fewer small firms - and across the country. The resulting loss
in manufacturing resilience and - possibly - productivity provide an important
counter argument to possible gains in financial stability that result from the same
process.
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Appendix
We start by rewriting equations (3a) and (3b). Solving for θ, we obtain:
θ =
E(RS)− ξη (Y− iS)− (1− ξ) N
η (Y− iS)− ξη (Y− iS)− (1− ξ) N(A.1a)
θ =
E(RL)− N
γE(RL|v = 1) + (1− γ)E(RL|v = 0)− N(A.1b)
At this point remember that small, opaque borrowers below a threshold value
θ of observable quality opt for small bank financing, and borrowers above that
threshold value choose large bank financing. Hence, the higher θ, the more the
presence of SEs depends on the availability of small bank financing. To see how
θ depends on the market share of small banks σs, we proceed by combining
equations (A.1a) and (A.1b) and obtain:
θ =σs
{
E(RS)− ξη (Y− iS)− (1− ξ) N
η (Y− iS)− ξη (Y− iS)− (1− ξ) N
}
+
(1− σs)
{
E(RL)− N
γE(RL|v = 1) + (1− γ)E(RL|v = 0)− N
}(A.2)
Therefore:
(A.3)
∂θ
∂σs
=
E(RS)− X
η (Y− iS)− X −
E(RL)− N
E(RL)|v− N
where X = ξη (Y− iS) − (1− ξ) N and E(RL)|v = γE(RL|v = 1) +
(1− γ)E(RL|v = 0).
Since 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1, we know from equation (A.1a) that E(RS) ≤ η (Y− iS) and
from equation (A.1b) that E(RL) ≤ E(RL)|v. Also, ∂θ∂σs is decreasing in N.
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